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STATE OF UTAH 
ARTHUR 0. NAUMAN, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
vs. 
HAROLD K. BEECHER AND 





ANSWER TO PETITION FOR REHEARING 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
Defendant does not adopt plaintiff's statement of facts 
in his Petition for Rehearing because it is inaccurate and 
misleading. The statement of facts contained in this court's 
opinion is a complete review of all the evidence and is cor-
rect. 
Defendant will review each point raised in plaintiff's 
Petition for Rehearing to refute the plaintiff's contentions. 
POINT I 
THE COURT WAS ACCURATE IN ITS DETERMI-
NATION THAT THE EARTH PROJECTION WHICH 
JUDGE HANSON SAID FELL ON NAUMAN DID NOT 
IN FACT FALL AT ALL. 
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Nauman attempts (Point I) to show that the earth 
projection which Judge Hanson said fell onto Nauman is 
a different earth projection than the projection which is 
still in place after the accident as shown in the picture 
pasted on the back cover of Respondent's Brief. The larg-
er and clearer photograph of that scene (which shows the 
South bank of the excavation immediately after the acci-
dent) found in the back of Tucker's deposition (Exhibit 
P-52), when compared with the photographs taken the day 
before the accident (Ex. P-7 and D-31) conclusively illus-
trate the accuracy of this Court's decision which holds that 
the earth projection did not fall. The only earth projec-
tion near the light pole is the projection immediately to 
the left of the large hose which extends from the right 
side of the light pole into the excavation, and that earth 
projection simply did not fall. Judge Hanson specifi-
cally referred to a "large projection at the top of the 
trench" (R. 458) (emphasis added) and not to a sluffing 
off "high on the south bank" as contended in Nauman's 
Petition for Rehearing (P. 7). There simply is no earth 
projection depicted in the photograph taken the day be-
fore the accident (Ex. P-7 and D-31) which is not still 
there after the accident (photograph in back of Ex. P-52). 
Nauman's argument to the effect that Judge Hanson's 
finding that the "large earth projection at the top of the 
trench" had reference to an alleged earth projection 5 
or more feet below the top of the excavation is untrue. 
Nauman admits in his Petition for Rehearing (P. 7, last 
sentence) that the slough off came from the darker area 
in the photograph taken after the accident (Ex. P-13 and 
P-16), which is consistent with this Court's decision and 
is inconsistent with Judge Hanson's decision (R. 458). 
In his brief Nauman says: 
"We ask the Court to look at Plaintiff's Exhibit 
13 and 16 and see for itself the area where the cave-
in occurred." 
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VVe agree that the darker areas in that photograph 
(moist earth left exposed by the slough off is darker) de-
picts the source of the earth that sloughed off and fell 
onto the wooden form that struck and injured Nauman. 
Nauman's argument, that the earth that fell from the 
darker area depicted in exhibits 13 and 16 was the "large 
projection at the top of the trench" referred to by Judge 
Hanson, is refuted by the language of Judge Hanson's 
memorandum decision. The following l'anguage used by 
Judge Hanson in his memorandum decision (R. 458) ex-
pressly excludes that area as the area from which the earth 
fell which caused Nauman's injuries: 
"The defendant refers to a certain picture intro-
duced in evidence which shows a sluffing off the side. 
This picture is the one depicting the removal of the 
plaintiff from the trench. However, if that sluffing is 
viewed in light of the testimony given by the defendants 
it would only possibl'y have covered the plaintiff's feet. 
However, in examining other exhibits it appears that 
there is a large projection at the top of the trench which, 
in the opinion of the Court, would have to have fallen 
in order to put the weight on the form that the de-
fendant (sic) was standing behind at the time of the 
sluffing. This appears to be clearly logical in view of 
the large amount of dirt that was on top of the defen-
dant at the time they attempted to rescue him." 
This Court's decision correctly reasons that the proxi-
mate cause of Nauman's injuries was the wooden form, 
not the slough off from the earth bank which would not 
have injured Nauman but for the presence of the wooden 
form. The quantity and weight of the earth which came 
from the darker area shown in Exhibits 13 and 16 was 
sufficient to account for Nauman's injuries. The claimed 
negligence of the architect was not in fact the proximate 
cause of Nauman's injuries. 
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POINT II 
THIS COURT PROPERLY CONCLUDED THERE 
WAS NO REASONABLE BASIS IN THE EVIDENCE 
TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT FINDING THAT 
PLAINTIFF WAS NOT CONTRIBUTORILY NEGLI-
GENT. 
This court in its opinion stated: 
"[I] f there is no reasonable basis in the evidence 
to support the findings (of the trial court) they cannot 
be sustained." 
See Memmot v. U.S. Fuel Co., 22 U.2d 356, 453 P.2d 
155, Smith v. Gallegos, 16 U.2d 344, 400 P.2d 570, cited by 
this court. 
Plaintiff claims in his Petition for Rehearing this 
court could not rely on the published deposition of Nau-
man. The deposition of Arthur Nauman of February 19, 
1966, was published (R.593) along with all the depositions 
in the file. Plaintiff stipulated that all depositions could 
be published ( R.593). 
The designation of the record on appeal included "all 
the proceedings, exhibits and evidence in the above en-
titled action, it being the intent of the appellant herein 
to designate the entire record." (R. 500) This obviously 
included all the depositions which were part of the file. 
Plaintiff made no objection to the depositions being in-
cluded in the record on appeal. The deposition of Nauman 
was used at the trial and, therefore, was properly included 
in the record on appeal (R. 703). It is respectfully sub-
mitted that the entire record on appeal is subject to review 
by this court. 
The fact referred to by this court from Nauman's de-
position of February 19, 1966 (which was published) was: 
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"that he (Nauman) considered the area around the light 
pole dangerous and observed the earth in that area was 
not sloped and was near vertical or overhanging." 
This fact was undisputed. Nau man testified to this 
fact on his cross examination (R. 699-670). 
"Q. (By Mr. Barker) : From the south wall, how far 
south was the light pole? 
A. (Nauman): How far into the lawn from the 
excavation? The light post was approximately 
six, to maybe a maximum of maybe eight feet. 
Q. Then you would have to add some additional feet 
to get to the south wall of the tunnel if you an-
swered my full question, would you not? 
A. Very little, since at that point the wa~l was al-
most vertical with no slope, as it was in most 
of the rest of the excavation." (Emphasis added) 
Appellate courts have considered depositions in their 
review of the record. 
In Foerstel v. St. Louis Public Service Co., 241 S.W.2d 
792 (Mo. App. 1951), plaintiff sued defendant for per-
sonal injuries sustained in an automobile-streetcar col-
lision. Plaintiff prevailed at trial and defendant moved 
for a new trial, one ground for which was newly discov-
ered evidence. Defendant had asked plaintiff on deposi-
tion if he had ever been hospital'ized. Plaintiff answered 
he had not, but subsequently defendant discovered he had. 
On appeal from a denial of defendant's motion for new 
trial, plaintiff claimed the court could not consider the 
question because the deposition was not a part of the 
record, not in evidence and was never received in evidence 
by the trial court. The appellate court reversed, holding: 
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"The fact was brought to the attention of the 
court at the argument for the motion for new trial. 
It was not objected to then, or later, nor has the 
fact been controverted at any stage of the proceed-
ing that the question and answer actually appeared 
in the deposition. Therefore it should and will be 
considered and weighed notwithstanding the techni-
cal considerations advanced. Bradley v. City of 
Spickardsville, 90 Mo. App. 416, loc. cit. 425. A court 
of review is not to be hamstrung by such technicalities 
in its search for truth. Such a handicap would make a 
mockery of appellate review and give a new and bizarre 
meaning to the blindfold over the eyes of the Goddess 
of Justice." Id. at 795. 
In St. Louis-San Francisco R.R. Co. v. Fox, 359 P.2d 
710 (Okla., 1961), plaintiff-motorist sued defendant for 
personal injuries suffered in a collision with a train. Plain-
tiff obtained a judgment at trial and defendant appealed. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma affirmed subject to re-
mittitur. Defendant unsuccessfully contended that the trial 
court erred in allowing plaintiff to introduce portions of 
defendant's depositions as an admission against interest, 
even though the defendant was present in the courtroom 
and available to testify. 
The Appellate Court held that even if the portions of 
the depositions were wrongfully admitted, the evidence 
elicited had already been established by other witnesses. 
The Court felt that such led ". . . to the inevitable concl'u-
sion that such evidence was, at most, merely cumulative 
and, if erroneously admitted, such constituted harmless 
error." Id. at 714. 
Since this testimony was cumulative it would be im-
material whether it came from the transcript or from 
Nauman's deposition. 
Viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the 
plaintiff does not mean ignoring uncontradicted testimony 
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which favors the defendant. (See Kimiko Toma v. Utah 
Power & Light, 12 U.2d 278, 365 P.2d 788 (1961). 
The following facts, which this court ref erred to in 
its opinion were undisputed. 
Nauman was authorized to install whatever shoring 
he considered appropriate. 
"Q. (Barker): You were authorized to put in what-
ever shoring you felt was appropriate. 
A. (Nauman): Yes. 
Q. There was material upon the bank for shoring, 
was there not? 
A. There was material on the bank and in the pipe[d] 
tunnel that I was instructed to use for shoring 
material. If I needed more than that material 
we could go to the mill and obtain some more." 
(R. 687). (Emphasis added) 
Nauman did not have any additional shoring installed 
because he considered the conditions safe for the work 
they were doing. 
"Q. (Barker) : Did you consider the conditions, as 
they then existed, to be safe for what you were 
doing? 
A. (Nauman): As I understood the conditions at 
the time I considered it safe for the work that 
we were doing in regards to leveling the gravel, 
pumping the water, taking the higher portions of 
soil out of the excavation, with the gravel fill." 
(R. 690) (Emphasis added) 
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As this court stated: 
"There was no showing that he (Nauman) was 
compelled to proceed with the work until this (making 
the excavation safe) was done." 
Wally Christiansen (project manager for contractor) 
explained to Nauman the problems he had with the excava-
tion: 
"Q. (Barker): In the construction shack, after Mr. 
Nauman arrived, I would like you to tell us what 
was said in that conversation, either by you or 
Mr. Nauman, concerning shoring or sloping the 
banks of the excavation, or concerning complaints 
made by the architect's representative, or by the 
representative of the City Engineer's office, con-
cerning that excavation. 
A. (Wally Christiansen) : * * * and as I recall I re-
member the conversation that I mentioned that 
has been a real thorn in my side, the excavation 
over in that area, that I have had some problems 
with the inspectors over there and them thinking 
I was running an unsafe job over there, and, of 
course, I figured we were not running an unsafe 
job, and that I was gl.ad he was there to help me 
out and get this show completed. 
--
I think I also said that we won't be worrying 
about-we won't be concerned about shoring the 
banks because we have sloped the banks now so 
we won't have the shoring to contend with. We 
have sloped the banks, and if you go over there, 
if you feel we need to slope them any further, I 
have a dragline over there in the operation work-
ing so you can have him slope them even further 
if you feel we need to do that. In other words, for 
the safety of the job, we have the trucks and 
machines there to do it. 
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This is about the extent of the conversation. 
We may have had other things said, and I can't 
recall them, in expl'anation. That is the meat of the 
conversation." (R. 797-798) (Emphasis added) 
Nauman admitted that he had been employed in con-
struction work for 17 years (R. 668). He had worked on 
a number of important projects, including the University 
of Utah Medical Center and the Boy Scout Building in 
Salt Lake City, Utah. He also admitted that every job 
has some amount of excavation from a small amount to a 
great amount (R. 668). 
Nauman worked in the excavation on the Medical Cen-
ter which was about 18 feet deep. 
"Q. (Barker) : Some of them had excavations deeper 
than this excavation, did they not? 
A. (Nauman): None. None to my knowledge. The 
deepest excavation that I can recall was the exca-
vation of the east side of the Medical Center, the 
University Medical Center. 
Q. How deep approximately was that? 
A. 18 feet. 
Q. Excuse me. I didn't hear you. 
A. 18 feet." (R. 668) 
Nauman personally examined the walls of the excava-
tion: 
"Q. (Barker): Did you look the walls over for safety 
purposes on the 16th and 17th, the walls of the 
excavation? 
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A. (Nauman) : Briefly, to my satisfaction, yes." 
(R. 696) (Emphasis added) 
Nauman felt it was safe to send workmen in the 
trench for the work they were doing. 
"Q. (Barker): And did you consider those walls in 
such manner that it was safe to send workmen 
into the excavation? 
A. (Nauman): Yes, for the type of work we were 
doing." (R. 696) 
It is clear that plaintiff was fully aware of the condi-
tion of the walls prior to the cave-in. If the walls of the 
excavation were unsafe as alleged by Nauman, he had the 
authority and the means to correct the situation (R. 685-
687). 
The record substantiates this court's conclusion that 
Nauman was fully aware of the condition of the walls 
prior to the cave-in, and plaintiff's arguments that he was 
inexperienced with excavations and that he was on the 
job only nine and one-half hours prior to the accident do 
not relieve him of his responsibility under the circum-
stances. 
POINT III 
THERE WAS NO SUBSTANTIAL COMPETENT 
EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT THE TRIAL COURT'S FIND-
ING THAT DEFENDANT WAS NEGLIGENT. 
Plaintiff, in his Petition for Rehearing, woul'd have 
this court completely ignore testimony brought out on cross 
examination and uncontradicted evidence which favors the 
defendant. 
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This court has previously held that the testimony of a 
witness is no stronger than l'eft on cross examination. See 
Alvarado v. Tucker, 2 U.2d 16, 268 P.2d 986 (1954). 
The following review of the points raised in Point III of 
Respondent's Petition for Rehearing, (considered in the 
same order) conclusively shows there was no substantial, 
competent evidence to support the trial court's finding of 
negligence. 
A. The Testimony of Defendant's On-Site Inspector, Jona-
than H. Tucker. 
Tucker was at the excavation on the morning of Oc-
tober 17, 1963. He noticed some loose dirt under the lamp 
pole and was going to look for Wally to tell him about it 
when the cave-in occurred. Tucker was asked if he said 
anything to Nauman about the l'oose dirt. 
"Q (Barker): Did you mention anything to Nauman 
about the loose dirt you saw? 
A. (Tucker) : Well, I considered where he was it 
was perfectly safe. He was at the end of the 
concrete that had already been poured. (Tucker 
Deposition taken October 8, 1968, p. 60) . " 
(Emphasis added) 
This testimony was uncontradicted. 
On October 16, 1963, Nauman asked Tucker what he 
considered to be the problem involved with the excava-
tion or why there should have been a complaint as men-
tioned earlier in the day by Mr. Christiansen (R. 662). 
Tucker said that in his opinion the walls of the tunnel 
could be sloped more and that it would make it safer 
(R. 662). 
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Nauman obviously felt there was no need for further 
sloping because he didn't order any additional sloping, ail-
though Ashby, the dragline operator, had been told to do 
whatever Nauman told him to do (R. 685). 
Neither Nauman nor Tucker thought the excavation 
was dangerous. They both considered it safe for the work 
that was being done. 
B. The Architect's Own Records. 
In reviewing the architect's records, it is important 
to recall that this construction project covered approximately 
eleven acres and the trench for the utility tunnel was only 
a small part of the job. The inspector's daily report sheet 
dated October 17, 1963, (P-8) states, "Mr. Casper Nelson, 
State Safety Commissioner, made an investigation of the 
accident, and then checked the waUs at Area "B". 
Area "B" is the Jail Building approximately one block 
east of the utility tunnel where the cave-in occurred and 
has no bearing on this accident. There were tunnels in that 
area also. (See Exhibit P-9 and Exhibit P-8.) 
C. The Testimony of Casper Nelson. 
At the time of the trial, Nelson testified on direct 
examination that the walls of the tunnel' were "real vertical, 
rather irregular as one might expect with a drag line exca-
vation." (R. 630) However, on cross examination he ad-
mitted the walls had been sloped ten or eleven feet on both 
sides. 
"Q. (Nebeker): You indicate that the top would be 
cut back perhaps ten feet on the north side and 
about the same distance on the south side, is that 
your testimony? 
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A. (Nelson) : Assuming that this wall originally was 
in line with this (indicating)? 
Q. Yes. 
A. Yes. 
Q. You are indicating the wall on the south side of 
the excavation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Assuming that had been vertical, it has been cut 
back maybe ten feet. Do you recall at the time we 
took your deposition making the measurement on 
there and indicating that was probably about 
eleven feet? 
A. Something like that. 
Q. In that neighborhood? 
A. We guessed. I don't remember now. 
Q. That was your judgment? 
A. Yes." (R639-640) (Emphasis added) 
D. The Testimony of Art Nauman. 
As heretofore stated, Nauman testified he considered 
the excavation safe for the work they were doing imme-
diately prior to the cave-in (See page 7 above.) 
"Q. (Barker): Did you consider the conditions, as 
they then existed, to be safe for what you were 
doing? 
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A. (Nauman): As I understood the conditions at the 
time I considered it safe for the work that we 
~ere doing in regards to leveling the gravel, pump. 
mg the water, taking the higher portions of soil 
out of the excavation, with the gravel fill." 
(R 690) 
E. The Testimony of Harry Butcher, the Project Engineer. 
Butcher testified the walls of the excavation were 
straight up and down except where they had been sloped 
a little at the top (R. 563). Butcher admitted on cross 
examination that the south bank (where the accident oc-
curred) had been sloped back ten feet (R. 591). 
F. The Testimony of Joe L. Ulibarri. 
This court's analysis of Ulibarri's testimony was as 
follows: 
"An eye witness to the cave-in, John L. Ulibarri, 
was working just ten feet away from the area where 
and when the cave-in took place. He testified the walls 
were straight up and down on the south side; that the 
walls of the banks looked dangerous to him. He was 
not a qualified expert ; and he had made no protest, 
nor called to anyone's attention the condition of the 
walls. It is difficult to understand why he was work-
ing in this excavation if it appeared dangerous to him, 
since he should have been concerned for his own safety. 
Under those circumstances, his testimony, when con.. 
sidered in connection with all of the evidence in the case, 
could not properly be regarded as substantial evidence 
that the condition of the tunnel was so dangerous that 
the architect should have known and acted upon it." 
(Emphasis added) 
In view of all the other evidence that the excavation 
appeared safe or that it was properly sloped, defendant sub-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
15 
mits that Ulibarri's testimony does not constitute substan-
tial evidence that the condition of the excavation was 
dangerous. 
G. The Testimony of Evan Ashby. 
Ashby testified he thought the trench was safe for 
the work that was being done by Nauman. 
"Q. (Nebeker) : Mr. Ashby, in your experience in 
excavations and the observations you made of this 
trench, do you have an opinion as to whether or 
not the trench was safe for the work that was 
being done by Mr. Nauman and the other work-
men in that trench? 
A. (Ashby): Yes. 
Q. What is that opinion? 
A. I felt that the trench was safe." (R. 891) (Empha-
sis added) 
H & I. The Utah State General Safety Order and the 
American Standard Safety Code. 
These documents state the requirements for sloping a 
trench over 4 feet in depth which is 112 to 1 angle. This is 
not in dispute. As the court noted in its opinion, there should 
be one foot of slope to each two feet of depth. 
It is respectfully submitted that all the witnesses (ex-
cept Ulibarri) testified either that the trench was safe for 
the work that was being done, or was sloped in substantial 
compliance with the requirements of the Industrial Com-
mission. 
Defendant submits that this court properly found there 
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was no substantial competent evidence to support the trial 
court's finding that defendant was negligent. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT'S OPINION CLEARLY STATES WHAT 
EVIDENCE IS NECESSARY TO ESTABLISH LIABIL-
ITY AGAINST THE DEFENDANT IN THIS CASE. 
This court in its opinion stated: 
"In a suit against an architect, plaintiff's allega-
tion and proof must show (1) the architect failed to 
meet the standard of his profession in preparing plans 
or supervising the work, or (2) that failure to super-
vise the work properly in accordance with the terms of 
his contract resulted in injury." 
It is difficult to see how there could be a more explicit 
declaration of the law than that made by this court. 
This court further stated: 
"The liability of architects is based upon profes-
sional negligence with respect to which only those 
qualified in the field can testify as to the standard of 
competence and care possessed by professional men in 
the locality and whether there has been a breach of 
that Standard of Care." See Covil v. Robert & Co. 
Associates, 144 S.E.2d 450 (Ga. App., 1965). 
Plaintiff relied upon paragraph 12a of the contract 
between the owners and contractor which provides: 
"If, in the judgment of the architect and/or the 
city engineer or county engineer, it is necessary to 
close down the work due to ... circumstances arising 
during the progress of the work, that may be construed 
to be dangerous ... the Contractor shall comply and he 
shall stop all operations . . . until further orders in 
writing are given ... " 
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As this court correctly observed : 
"A.ssuming this provision applies to the defendant, 
even t,'wugh it was not a party to said contract, and did 
not sign it, whether or not the architect exercised prop-
er or reasonable judgment, would have to be based 
upon the testimony of other architects and not upon the 
testimony of lay persons. Yet, the plaintiff did not 
produce any architect as a witness." (Emphasis added) 
Defendant submits that the foregoing statement of the 
law is correct. See Paxton v. Alameda County, 259 P.2d 934 
(Cal. App., 1953). 
Assuming Beecher was bound by the terms of the con-
tract whether or not he exercised proper judgment would 
have to be based upon the testimony of other architects 
and not by lay persons. The plaintiff failed to produce any 
architect as a witness, even though he had one present in 
the court room during a substantial part of the trial'. 
As this court stated, if the trench was so dangerous any 
person could recognize the danger, then the trial court could 
have based its findings on the testimony of lay persons. 
However, as previously discussed, all of the lay persons 
except one considered that where the plaintiff was it was 
perfectly safe, or admitted the excavation had been properly 
sloped. 
All of the expert witnesses (four architects) testified 
the area appeared safe or met the requirements of the 
Industrial Commission. 
Defendant claims this courts' opinion is a clear expres-
sion of the law relating to the liability of architects. The 
opinion also shows this court made an exhaustive analysis 
· of the evidence and properly concluded that there was no 
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substantial, competent evidence to support the trial court 
finding that the defendant was negligent. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff's Petition for Rehearing presents no new legal 
or factual matters. Defendant respectfully submits that the 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and judgment en-
tered by the trial court were thoroughly reviewed by this 
court in its opinion. The record clearly shows that the trial 
court's findings and conclusions were not supported by 
substantial evidence. The record does show that the d&-
fendant met the standard of care observed by architects in 
the locality. Defendant respectfully requests that the Peti-
tion for Rehearing be denied. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
STEPHEN B. NEBEKER 
and 
RONALD C. BARKER 
Attorneys for Defendant-
Appellant. 
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